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 1 
US military, airspace, and meteorological radar system impacts from utility class 
wind turbines: implications for renewable energy targets and the wind industry. 
 
Abstract  
A substantial number of wind energy projects have been stalled or abandoned in the 
United States of America (US) due to concerns over the effects of wind turbines on 
radar installations. Between 2008 and 2010, military, airspace, or meteorological radar 
concerns in the US contributed to the delay or abandonment of an estimated 20,000 
MW of wind energy capacity. These delays are a likely major factor influencing the 
current US Administration’s failure to double non-hydro renewable generation from 
2008 to 2011; a target stated by the US President in a joint session address to Congress 
in February 2009. The delays are also a threat to the US Department of Energy’s target 
to produce 20% of electricity from wind energy by 2030 - unless radar-related barriers 
are mitigated. This work includes interviews with two senior representatives, from the 
US Department of Defence (DOD) and the American Wind Energy Association 
(AWEA), discussing the nature of concerns pertaining to the effects of wind turbines on 
radar and military/aviation in the US alongside approaches that have been trialled that 
aim to resolve such concerns. This research finds that the Energy Siting Clearing House, 
established within the DOD to review delayed wind farm projects, has brought much 
needed coordination to the approval process. A key challenge for any review body, 
however, will be to deliver an objective outcome that is not overturned by alternative 
political agendas. Integral to the success of any approach will be a sufficient capacity 
and mandate to facilitate the technical and non-technical cross-disciplinary and 
interagency research generating a balance between military, airspace, meteorological, 
and wind energy industry/political objectives. 2 
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Introduction 
The US’s strong commitment to national security policies, with an annual defence 
budget of over USD650 billion [1], focuses on preventing acts of terrorism on American 
soil, fighting wars overseas, and the disruption and dismantling of terrorist organisations 
such as al-Qa’ida [2]. In serving this policy, the US DOD has publicly reported that 
utility class turbines can have a ‘significant impact’ on the operational capabilities of air 
defence radar, can interfere with military testing and training capabilities, and can 
obstruct Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty monitoring [3]. The objectives of this work 
are to contextually define the nature of US concerns pertaining to the effects of wind 
turbines on radar and military sites, determine the impact of these concerns on US 
installed wind energy capacity, and analyse proposed solutions. 
 
The US wind industry and renewable energy targets 
While the US does not have binding federal renewable energy targets [4], rapid wind 
energy development is supported by the current US Administration [5]. Wind energy is 
increasingly viewed as the most commercially viable option to expand renewable 
energy generation in the US. Installed wind generation capacity in the US accounts for 
around 20% of current global installed capacity. With approximately 50,000 MW 
installed and additionally around 9,000 MW under construction [6], wind energy has 
been growing at a faster rate than any other US energy source since 2008 [6, 7]. The 
average production cost of USD0.04 per kWh (with the production tax credit) over the 3 
last few years in the US has seen wind energy a direct competitor with thermal fossil 
fuel electricity generation on a cost per unit basis [8]. At present, 38 US states now have 
utility class turbines and 14 states each have over 1,000 MW of wind installed. The 
average capacity of  installed wind turbines is 2.15 MW and the machines are  typically 
over 400 feet (122 m) tall with 300 feet (92 m) rotor diameters [6, 9]. The current US 
Administration aimed to double US renewable energy generation by 2011 from 2008 
levels [5, 10]; primarily through supporting wind energy development through 
government grants and tax incentives, such as the 2009 American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA), which include tax credits, a traditional wind development 
incentive in the US. Despite government incentives, the 2011 target was not met. In 
2008 the renewable energy (non-hydro) installed power capacity was 3.8% of the 
national total, of which wind energy accounted for 2.3% (25,300 MW) [4, 8]. The net 
energy generation from non-hydro renewables in 2008 was around 125 TWh  (3.13% of 
4,112 TWh), of which an estimated 53 TWh was generated from the wind sector (1.3% 
of the national total) [8, 11]. Three years later in 2011, the net electricity generated by 
renewable energy was only 195 TWh, 50% greater generation than 2008 levels rather 
than 100% greater [11]. Whilst the Obama Administration’s target was aspirational, in 
2008 the DOE envisioned that 20% of the country’s electricity could come from wind 
energy by 2030 [12]. The DOE’s ‘20/30’ target, alongside state wind energy targets 
reinforce this vision of growth. It remains to be seen whether state-based targets and the 
US DOE’s ‘20/30’ target will befall the same fate as the US Administration’s target. In 
Massachusetts for example, the state government aims to have 2,000 MW of installed 
wind capacity by 2020; an aggressive target considering Massachusetts 2009 wind 
capacity was around 9 MW [13]. State targets such as these may be seriously re-
evaluated in the next few years when radar impacts are taken into consideration. The 4 
Massachusetts example may be a case in point, as the small state also hosts one of the 
US’s large phased array radars for missile re-entry vehicle detection. Aggressive wind 
turbine expansion may potentially impact detection and tracking of nuclear weaponry 
systems without proper planning approaches. The DOE’s ‘20/30’ assessment estimates 
16,000 MW of wind energy capacity is required to be installed each year by the year 
2018 to achieve the 20% target of around 300 GW installed by 2030 [12]. 
Representatives of the US wind industry are dubious this will be achieved without first 
resolving radar and airspace concerns pertaining to wind turbines [9, 14].  
 
Radar technology in use in the US, and target detection.  
Radar is used in both civilian and military operations for air traffic, air defence, and 
weather forecasting/monitoring. A basic radar system consists of a transmitter, an 
antenna, a receiver, and a processor, with the transmitter emitting pulses of 
electromagnetic energy that reflect off objects known as ‘targets’ in the radar’s line of 
sight. The antenna and processor detect and analyse the information in the reflected 
signal back to the radar [3, 15, 16]. There are two main categories of radar surveillance 
systems, primary and secondary. Primary Surveillance Radar (PSR) provides a two- or 
three-dimensional representation of a target. A number of factors can influence the 
quality of PSR: transmitter power; target distance; the target size (or Radar Cross 
Section [RCS]); antenna geometry; obstructions, and; reflections from other objects. e.g. 
hills, buildings, wind turbines [3, 14, 16, 17]. In contrast, Secondary Surveillance Radar 
(SSR) uses coded signals to obtain information about a target, and consequently SSR 
systems are typically unaffected by reflections such as wind turbines [3]. 
The DOD, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and National Oceanic 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) operate a vast network of radar assets in the US; 5 
yet it is an aging network with around 80% of all US radars being commissioned from 
the 1950s to 1980s [18]. There are 283 air traffic control (ATC) radars of various 
models in the US, of which 110 are modern digital ASR-11’s deployed in the 1990s, 
135 are ASR-10’s deployed in the 1980s, and 38 are analogue ASR-8’s deployed in the 
1970s [19]. ATC radars consist of both PSR and SSR systems monitoring aircraft in and 
around air fields, and typically have PSR coverage of up to 60 miles (100 km) and SSR 
coverage of around double that of PSR [20]. In contrast, Long Range Radar (LRR) is 
used for air defence and to track aircraft in between airports [21]. LRR systems are 
described as the historical ‘back bone of primary surveillance in the US’ (Blackman, 
cited in [19], pp. 24). Two-dimensional FPS-20, the Air Route Surveillance Radars 
(ARSR) 1 and 2 are the most common type of LRR in the US with 65 systems deployed 
in the 1950s and 1960s, and upgraded in the 1980s [19]. (See Table 1). Modern 3D 
ARSR 4s, deployed in the 1990s are the second most common LRR system with 43 in 
service in the US [22]. There are also 13 ASRS 3s (deployed in the 1970s and upgraded 
in the 1980s) and 7 tethered aerostat radar systems (TARS, or moored balloons) 
deployed in the 1980s [19]. Current LRR systems are digital, and provide coverage up 
to 290 miles (470 km) [22], while the older systems are analogue [23], ranging up to 
200 miles (320 km). The 128 various model LRR types in the US [19] are 
predominantly located in perimeter states [22]. Missile Early Warning Radar (EWR) are 
very large, high-powered phased array systems designed to detect and track objects with 
low radar reflectivity with a high level of accuracy over a range in excess of 5,000 
kilometres (i.e. nuclear weapon re-entry vehicles and possible counter measures 
designed to confuse defensive systems). There are only two EWR radars in the US, one 
on the east coast in Massachusetts and another on the west coast in California [3]. The 
US weather forecasting and severe weather warning capability is underpinned by 6 
NOAA’s 159 ‘Next Generation Weather Radar’ (NEXRAD) systems, also known as the 
Weather Surveillance Radar-1988 Doppler (WSR-88D). The WSR-88D’s are used in 
combination with FAA’s 45 Terminal Doppler Weather Radars (TDWR) [24]. The 
WSR-88D’s have an approximate short range of 143 miles (230 km), and a long range 
of 286 miles (460 km) [25].  
  
Table 1. Selected US radar in use, and performance/deployment status. 
 
ARSR-1 
/ARSR-2 
/FPS-20 
1950’s model, 2D, L-band frequency long range radars with a maximum 
range of 200 miles (320 km). Radar models are being replaced with 
ARSR-4 [26]. 
ARSR-3  3D long range radar providing coverage up to 240 miles (380 km) [26]. 
ARSR-4  The most modern 3D long range surveillance radar. Radar provides 
improved reliability, improved ability to track small object (via minimised 
clutter), and coverage up to 250 nautical miles (460 km) [22]. 
ASR-8  Analogue Air Surveillance Radar with limited processing capability when 
compared to modern radar types. Radar type is being replaced with the 
ASR-11 [27]. 
ASR-10  Flexible, modern radar that meets the requirements of the US FAA/DOD 
ASR-11 next generation radar [20]. 
ASR-11  Digital Air Surveillance Radar providing PSR coverage of 60 miles (100 
km) and SSR coverage of 120 miles (200 km) [20]. Radar provides digital 
processing, improved reliability, and improved performance not available 
in earlier models [27]. 
WSR-88D  Modern weather radar using Doppler maps to detect rain, hail, and 
snowfall [3], with an approximate short range of 230 km, and a long range 
of 460 km [25]. 
 
  
 
The influence of wind turbines on radar.  
The influence of wind turbines and wind farms on various radar systems is 
notoriously complex and differs between technologies. In simple terms it reduces the 
range and quality of surveillance available, although many aspects are amenable to 
mitigation measures [28]. ATC radar and LRR adopt processing techniques to 7 
distinguish between the electromagnetic echo of aircraft and the clutter of unwanted 
targets [15] such as buildings, ground, and wind turbines [29]. Aircraft have a high level 
of RCS, fly at predictable elevations, which antennae can be directed towards, and are 
in constant motion creating a Doppler shift that Moving Target Indication/Detection 
(MTI/D) can distinguish. Low RCS threshold filters can remove low RCS object clutter 
[27, 29]. Constant False Alarm Rate (CFAR) processing can be used to determine the 
average background echo per cell of radar coverage. Amplitude thresholds can then be 
used to only pick up objects with echoes above that of the background average [14]. 
RCS thresholds, antennae orientation, MTI/D processing, and CFAR’s are all minimum 
standard for most modern radar [29]. However, radars’ antennae orientation during 
monitoring of low flying aircraft can have difficultly filtering out utility-scale wind 
turbines, particularly those with high hub-heights with large moving blades, as typical 
MTI/D algorithms are unable to differentiate between an aircraft and a turbine, which 
may also erroneously become a target [16, 17, 29, 30]. Furthermore, wind turbines with 
large RCS changes with wind direction and blade orientation can raise the CFAR 
threshold, leading to aircraft, often with a smaller RCS becoming undetected when 
flying in the shadow of the turbine [16, 17, 28, 29, 31]. In terms of meteorology, the 
large RCS of wind turbines have similar characteristics to rainfall, snow, hail, some 
storm patterns, and are often greater than large aircraft such as a Boeing 747 [3, 17]. 
Modern RCS filters have difficulty in differentiating wind turbine clutter from other 
signals [3, 14, 16, 24, 30]. It is not known precisely what distances or situations will 
cause operational weather warning impacts on the WSR-88Ds, although it is known 
they are more likely to occur when turbines are in close proximity, are great in number, 
and when turbine blades intrude into multiple radar angles, etc. [17, 30, 32]. While 
meteorological and military radar systems use a number of similar methods to 8 
distinguish between target objects and unwanted clutter [14, 16, 28, 30, 32, 33], not all 
mitigation approaches are technical. For example, affected WSR-88D operators have 
gained more experience in managing wind turbine clutter over the last few years [32]. 
 
Method 
In addition to the literature review, this work incorporates information from two senior 
interviewees who were separately asked open-ended questions about the impact and 
influence that military, airspace, and meteorological radar technology has had on wind 
energy development in the US, including some proposed solutions. Information only 
specific to the US was included in this research, although the authors acknowledge that 
there are countries such as Germany and Spain with similar uses of radar technology 
and higher densities of wind turbines per square kilometre. A comparison between 
different countries in terms of turbine-related impacts on radar and mitigation measures 
is currently in progress by the authors as a separate piece of research. Only non-
classified information was sought in a semi-structured phone interview, with transcripts 
being scribed throughout. Ethics approval was obtained from the Murdoch University 
Human Research Ethics Committee (ethics permit number 2011/043). The two senior 
interviewees who kindly made their time available were David Belote, the Executive 
Director of the DOD Energy Siting Clearing House (interviewed August 2011), and the 
American Wind Energy Association’s (AWEA) Senior Director, Federal Regulatory 
Affairs Tom Vinson (interviewed July 2011). The interview with David Belote was 
conducted under the guidance of a DOD media advisor, with the interview also recorded 
by the DOD. The interviews were contextualised by examples where radar concerns 
influenced wind energy developments (and vice-versa), including the Shepherd’s Flat 
Wind Energy Project.  9 
 
Results and Discussion 
Scale of wind-radar impact versus national targets 
In 2009, 10,000 MW of proposed wind energy generation capacity was delayed in the 
US due to radar and military site concerns (AWEA, cited in [9]). From the interview 
conducted with Tom Vinson from AWEA, it was revealed that approximately another 
10,000 MW was delayed in 2010 for similar reasons
1
                                                           
1 The delays are unlikely to be exclusively radar-related, yet were deemed a major influence. 
 (at the time of the interview no 
data had been collated for 2011). These comments bolster evidence from Mr Webster, 
the Director of Wind Permitting and Environment at Iberdrola Renewables who, 
speaking on behalf of AWEA members, testified to Congress in 2010 that the growth 
necessary to achieve 20% of US electricity from wind energy by 2030 is unlikely to be 
achieved without first resolving radar and airspace concerns [18]. The estimated delay 
and abandonment of around 10,000 MW in both in 2009 and 2010 was a likely major 
factor of the current US Administration’s failure to achieve a target of doubling non-
hydro renewable generation from 2008 to 2011. The overall impact for the US wind 
industry over 2008-2010 is outlined in Figure 1, showing abandoned or delayed 
installed wind capacity, compared against the growth forecast required to achieve 20% 
of US energy from wind by 2030 - the annual target to be met by 2018 to meet the 
‘20/30’ target (16,000 MW). Such radar concerns will become an increasingly principal 
obstacle over the next 18 years when over 6-times the current generation base is to be 
installed to meet the ‘20/30’ target.   10 
 
Fig. 1. MW of installed, delayed, and abandoned wind energy capacity in the US, 2008-
2011. Sources: AWEA [4, 34-36], 2011 interview with Tom Vinson, AWEA cited in 
[9], and Blackman cited in [19]. Notes: * 2011 delayed/abandoned data was 
unavailable; 16,000 MW is the DOE’s ‘20/30’ target annual wind energy installation 
required to be attained by 2018, and maintained up to 2030. 
 
The FAA turbine impact assessment process: the cause of the past delays? 
Utility scale wind energy projects in the US are unable to start construction without 
FAA approval. The FAA in the US has the regulatory authority to review and evaluate 
the impact of new structures on civilian and military airspace use [37] and is the 
mechanism through which many wind developments have been held up, delayed or 
abandoned. To determine whether a proposed construction is a potential hazard to air 
safety or security, the FAA consults a number of relevant authorities, including the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the DOD. David Belote from the DOD 
identified that not being able to track small civilian aircraft is a fundamental concern of 
the DOD in relation to wind farms. A notice of ‘no hazard’ is issued by the FAA when 11 
there are no concerns raised by authorities about air safety from a proposed 
development, which enables a wind development to proceed from an air safety and 
security perspective. Alternatively, the FAA issue a notice of ‘presumed hazard’ when 
consulted authorities raise concerns over air safety or security. Notices of presumed 
hazard require wind developers to work in conjunction with the FAA and relevant 
authorities, in an effort to minimise potential hazards [37]. At this point in the process 
many wind development projects have historically been delayed. Wind farm developers 
are required to file a notice of proposed construction for each wind turbine within a 
wind project that may affect the navigable airspace. This is defined in the FAA 
Advisory Circular 70/7460 2K: 
•  Objects greater than 200 ft (61 m) in height above the ground level at its location.  
•  Objects within 20,000 ft (6,098 m) of a Public-Use or Military Airport or Seaplane 
Base where the object would exceed a 100:1 horizontal slope from the nearest point 
on the runway. 
•  Objects within 10,000 ft (305 m) of a Public-Use or Military Airport or Seaplane 
Base where the object would exceed a 50:1 horizontal slope from the nearest point 
on the runway. 
•  Objects within 5,000 ft (1,524m) of a Heliport pad and the object would exceed 
25:1 horizontal slope [38]. 
 
The FAA processes for notification, review, and collaboration with proposed wind 
farms appear to have been under considered by wind farm developers in the past. In 
2010, the Deputy Undersecretary of Defence for Installation and Environment, Dorothy 
Robyn, voiced concern that wind developers were notifying the FAA late in the wind 
project approval process, often after selecting sites and engaging investors. Robyn 12 
identified that late notification limits the scope for collaborative efforts to identify 
potential issues and mitigation options [39]. The lengths to which wind developers can 
be prepared to go to in order to avoid such issues is reinforced by testimony before the 
House Armed Services Committee in 2010 from Nancy Kalinowski, the Vice President 
of System Operations Services in the Air Traffic Organization. Kalinowski stated that 
primary FAA radar leaseholders have been offered substantial financial incentives from 
wind developers not to renew their FAA contract and to lease to wind turbine 
developments [40]. This lack of communication and consultation was highlighted in the 
interview with Tom Vinson from AWEA, who advocated that wind developers should 
engage relevant military/aviation/meteorological agencies as soon as possible in the 
development process. Vinson also stated that if agencies want wind farm developers to 
engage in a process 12-18 months prior to construction, there needs to be agreement 
about what can be discussed at each stage, and what information developers need to 
provide agencies. Vinson has also previously commented that military departments have 
not always been responsive and collaborative efforts to identify and resolve hazards 
have  been inconsistent, cited in [39]. Furthermore, Levitan [41] shows how input from 
government agencies have historically been uncoordinated and ‘last minute’, which was 
demonstrated in the case of Caithness Energy’s Shepherd’s Flat wind development.   
 
The Politics of the Shepherd’s Flat Wind Energy Project. 
Shepherd’s Flat is a 909 MW wind farm in northeast Oregon under construction by 
Caithness Energy, with a USD1.4 billion turbine deal with General Electric [42]. By 
2010 the project had been in development for almost nine years [43], with Caithness 
successfully working through more than four years of permit approval with county, 
state, and federal agencies, including the US Navy. Despite being notified of the project 13 
3 years earlier [44], the US Air Force raised concerns ‘at the 25th hour’ about the 
turbines’ potential to create further radar clutter and aircraft tracking interference issues 
for the long range Fossil radar located at Ore, over 70 miles (115 km) away. This denied 
the project its final FAA permit [43]. If construction is not completed by 2012, 
Caithness would lose its stimulus funding under the 2009 ARRA, damaging the 
project’s viability [41]. Eilperin [43] reported the Air Force’s action ‘sparked an intense 
lobbying battle and White House-led negotiations’ by senior Obama officials trying to 
resolve the Shepherd’s Flat issues. Oregon senators, Wyden and Merkley, alongside 
Caithness and General Electric officials also lobbied the White House, with Wyden 
using his nomination for future DOD staff as a bargaining tool [45, 46]. Merkley’s Press 
Office [46] reported that after a long ‘stand-off’ the Pentagon announced it would no 
longer block the project and would instead upgrade the nearby radar system, improving 
its ability to cope with wind turbine radar clutter – a move that would ‘eliminate the 
threat to other planned wind farms in the area’. Levitan [41] noted that Iberdrola 
Renewables who also have wind developments in the Shepherd’s Flat area with similar 
radar inference concerns have been helped by politicians who are keen to bring 
employment to the area. While this is good news for the wind energy industry, such ad-
hoc political interventions undermine the impartial scientific basis of the FAA impact 
assessment process. Nonetheless, increasing political interventions in wind energy 
projects insinuate a number of potential questions, including: the genuity of the 
magnitude of the DOD radar impacts - and whether they are to be superseded by 
economic development political agendas; the politics behind the DOD radar concerns - 
possibly being less operationally detrimental than is publicly advocated, and; the 
preservation of existing base radar environments and their relationship to military base 
closures. In 2010, Watson [47] reported that 20 major military installations will be 14 
closed by 2011 under the 2005 (under operation since 1988) Base Realignment and 
Closure (BRAC) Commission recommendations. Such closures negatively impact in 
local communities economically reliant on the base. It may be the case that wind 
turbines, which have the potential to degrade radar coverage at military bases, could be 
objected to in order to preserve the base facilities to help prevent a base from being 
recommended for future closure. Commenting on the split between the number of DOD 
concerns related to radar versus military sites, Belote explained that some military 
testing facilities require “an electromagnetic pristine environment” for testing 
technologies such as stealth and radar. Belote added that the nature of testing is, 
“…sensitive as we can’t talk about the frequency bands we use or what we are testing”. 
Adding, “The Bin Laden raids are a good example of the type of technology we might 
need to test”, referring to stealth-modified helicopter technology that is thought to have 
allowed US Navy Seals to evade the Pakistani radar network in the Bin Laden raid [48]. 
Belote indicated the DOD hope to get support for no wind turbine zones around 
required pristine testing sites. When Vinson was questioned regarding tensions between 
military sites with pristine radar testing facilities versus wind energy developments he 
stated “There’s a limited number of training areas in the US for such DOD activities. 
Issues around training areas primarily come from Nevada, California, and Texas”, 
indicating that most concerns are localised to a selected few and may be treated in 
isolation to the majority of sites. When asked more generally about inefficiencies in the 
FAA assessment process, Vinson said the DOD has taken measures to improve the FAA 
impact assessment process. Vinson summarised that the DOD have reorganised how 
they engage with wind developers, “Under Section 358, fiscal year 2011, of the 
National Defence Authorisation Act, they have developed a ‘one-stop-shop’ for 15 
developer engagement called the Department of Defence Energy Siting Clearing 
House...” 
 
The DOD Energy Siting Clearing House  
When Belote was asked about the impact that the establishment of the DOD Energy 
Siting Clearing House (Clearing House) has had on improving DOD and wind 
developer engagement, he stated that the Clearing House has already started to deliver 
results; “In the first round we looked at every project held up [by the DOD]… that was 
249 projects covering 6,300 turbines… We cleared [to proceed] 229 of them which 
represent 10 GW of renewable energy capacity”. Belote commented that the Clearing 
House “look at the projects from a long range radar angle, a military training angle, and 
from a military testing perspective.” Vinson stated the new process has been a positive 
development relative to earlier less-methodological determinations; “The Clearing 
House has been methodically going through the backlog of development applications 
and sorting them out”. Vinson indicated key engagement changes due to the Clearing 
House include: the proposed construction notice period for wind developments 
increased from 30 to 45 days; the Clearing House has now provided one access point to 
all relevant authorities at the Pentagon; the Clearing House is the only place for an 
official DOD response to a wind development proposal, and; only four people within 
the DOD now have the authority to say ‘no’ to a wind development proposal. Vinson 
also pointed out, “There are still some issues with individual services not being as 
collaborative as the Clearing House, however, overall we’ve received positive feedback 
[from our members]... People feel like they have access, and their concerns are being 
heard”.  16 
While these changes appear to improve some of the issues related with the FAA 
process, whether the Clearing House is able to provide an objective justification for 
concerns that lead to a balanced assessment of the impact against the benefits of wind 
energy proposals, and options for mitigation, remains a significant question. When 
asked about tools or processes that the Clearing House has put in place to make the 
assessment of what is an ‘acceptable level’ of wind turbine interference more objective, 
Belote indicated the Clearing House currently uses Geographic Information System 
tools and military judgement to conduct an initial assessment, which then undergo a 
detailed analysis from the affected division (including some turbine by turbine impact 
assessment from the 84
th Radar Evaluation Squadron). Belote said a desktop modelling 
tool based on turbine by turbine assessment “is around 18 months away”. Belote 
revealed DOD collaborations with the DOE and the Lincoln Laboratory at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) are conducting interagency field tests and 
evaluations of adaptive radar clutter mapping, in-fill and gap-fill radar to see behind 
turbines, a Raytheon concurrent beam process to track objects over and behind turbines, 
and a Lockheed Martin pencil beam radar. At the time of the interview, the DOD had 
invested over USD3 million to develop DOD endorsed solutions. Vinson commented 
that the DOD is working with MITs Lincoln Laboratory to field test the Lockheed TPS 
77 (a ground-based 3D radar with a range of around 550 km), and ‘off the shelf’ in-fill 
and gap-fill radars that have undergone some limited trials to date. Vinson also said the 
DOD has replaced an old ASR-8 with an ASR-11 at Travis Air Force Base, indicating 
that “The DOD are not comfortable to say they validate these mitigations” however, 
“they would agree this has improved coverage”. Belote suggested that most of the 
technical wind/radar concerns could be resolved with a collaborative approach between 
the wind industry, government agencies, and research scientists over the next 3 to 5 17 
years. Vinson related that the primary issue for radar upgrades is the cost. Wind farm 
developers outlaying around USD15-20 million for a Lockheed TPS 77 will not be an 
acceptable solution for a region with relatively few wind farm developments. Belote 
noted that wind developers paid for the “the entire cost of optimisation and changes to 
display...” for the mitigations at the Travis Air Force Base, and stated that he advocated 
that the DOD would be interested in exploring and promoting more cost-effective 
solutions, roughly in the order of 1% of total wind farm project costs. Belote reiterated 
that resolving wind/radar concerns will require collaboration between the DOD, other 
government agencies, and major wind developers, with an agreement of how to share 
the costs of such public-private partnerships. Vinson also shared the view that a 
collaborative approach to resolving concerns will be necessary; advocating that at 
present the aim should be a general understanding of what most of the challenges are, 
and of the technical solutions available, or that soon would be available. This research 
shows that whether these technical solutions will be available in a timely manner, and 
will be economically acceptable to all parties, will to a high-degree determine the extent 
of installed utility-scale wind turbines in the US. As Brenner et al. [21] noted, there has 
been a lack of funding allocated to promote the numerous mitigation research plans, 
including NOAA’s, the DOD, and even from the wind industry. Considering the 
congressional interest in the matter, Dougherty [49] stated that USD30 million should 
be appropriated over a five year research plan and allocated roughly equally to federal 
authorities and public-private partnerships for wind-radar impact mitigation projects. 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
Genuine concerns have been raised in the US around the impact of wind turbines on 
radar and military sites. A particular concern for the DOD appears to be the use of radar 18 
clutter and shadow zones by unfriendly aircraft to move below the radar detection 
ability; enabling them to potentially conduct missions undetected. These DOD concerns, 
raised through the FAA turbine impact assessment process, have contributed to a delay 
of US installed wind capacity. From the analysis it appears feasible such concerns could 
prevent the US from reaching its target of 20% of energy from wind energy by 2030 if 
the DOD does not maintain fostering the wind industry engagement with the FAA 
process. A key challenge for the FAA impact assessment process remains the provision 
of an objective outcome that is respected by Congress and is not overturned by 
alternative political agendas. Regarding contrasting agendas of rapid wind development 
and national security, Seifert [50] argued the issue matters most when wind farms pose 
an unreasonable risk to national security, and the benefits offered by the wind farm do 
not outweigh their interference impact. However, providing an objective assessment of 
where such a balance lies, including political pressures and the local community, 
remains a current non-technical challenge for the FAA impact assessment process. 
  Technical solutions available for deployment to assist resolving wind turbine 
interference with military, airspace, and meteorological radar are numerous with gap-
fill/in-fill radar, software upgrades, radar upgrades, spectral processing, and stealth 
technology as favoured solutions [14, 16, 19, 21, 25, 28, 30-32]. However, current 
technical solutions are limited in their abilities, with wind turbine technology, wind 
farm designs, and older radar systems in particular, all contributing to the wind turbine 
clutter problem [14, 19, 30]. Brenner et al. [21] argues the approach of simply 
preventing wind energy development is short-sighted, stating the 2006 DOD report on 
wind turbine interference favoured blocking the installation of offending turbines, rather 
than to attempt to find means of ameliorating the turbine impact. Both interviewed 
experts concur that an agreed research, development, and validation process is 19 
important to expand the range of mitigating technologies and options available to 
progress from the situation of the last few years. Pivotal to this agreement is the funding 
source for such activities to attract several stakeholders to develop collaborative 
projects. In addition to the considerable efforts at the DODs Clearing House, at present 
only NOAA’s National Weather Service and Radar Operations Center has dedicated 
research into how federal interests and the wind energy industry can coexist [30], 
however, additional research is necessary. Furthermore, it remains to be seen how the 
DOD’s Clearing House process, and the often distinct requirements of other 
organisations such as the DHS, FAA, NOAA, interact over the long-term, particularly in 
relation to weather radar system requirements. As the future utility-scale clean energy 
investment is crucial to the future US energy supply, additional coordination and also 
private sector funding into innovative mitigation options would be of benefit. This 
research recommends the following areas to progress future research: 
1) A detailed analysis of radar-technology specific concerns and solutions; 2) Technical 
research into enabling technologies (for example, synchronisation of multiple radar 
views, etc.), and; 3) A comprehensive examination of non-technical solutions/ 
policies/incentives for collaborative projects/activities and resultant streamlined 
improvements that meet security, safety, and meteorological requirements. 
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